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LIMITING DIRECTORS' DUTY OF
CARE LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
DELA WARE'S CHARTER
AMENDMENT APPROACH

Corporate directors are primarily responsible for monitoring
the performance and decisionmaking of management. 1 To promote this role, two nonmarket 2 methods have been developed to
ensure that directors· take an active interest in reviewing management recommendations. The first method is to expose directors to potential duty of care liability. Although the legal definition of a director's duty of care is subject to different· state
interpretations, it essentially requires that directors make decisions in an informed manner and with reasonable care. 3 The sec1. The monitoring model of the role of the board of directors recognizes that time
and information constraints prevent directors from determining business policy on their
own. The role of the board is therefore limited to a supervisory function; the board holds
management accountable for adequate results, while management retains responsibility
for determining what business policies to pursue. Effective monitoring requires that directors remain independent of the chief executive and sufficiently informed of the bases
of management decisions. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 164-66 (1976).
Recent cases have been particularly concerned with the failure of directors to perform
their monitoring role adequately. See infra note 22 (discussing Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1986)).
2. For a discussion of market mechanisms that encourage director diligence in supervising management, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
3. Duty of care liability was originally based on the common law requirement that
directors make such reasonable inquiry as circumstances required. In Barnes v. Andrews,
298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), Judge Learned Hand described the monitoring role of a
corporate director and his common law fiduciary duty of care as follows:
[A director's] liability must therefore depend on his failure in general to keep
advised of the conduct of the corporate affairs. The measure of a director's duties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting themselves with vague declarations, such as that a director must give reasonable attention to the corporate
business. While directors are collectively the managers of the company, they are
not expected to interfere individually in the actual conduct of its affairs. To do
so would disturb the authority of the officers and destroy their individual responsibility, without which no proper discipline is possible. To them must be left
the initiative and the immediate direction of the business; the directors can act
individually only by counsel and advice to them. Yet they have an individual
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ond, and more recently developed,' method is to encourage the
seating of outside independent persons on corporate boards.
Outside directors are believed to be more likely to question and
challenge management decisions than inside directors who are
themselves corporate officers. 11
Directors' reluctance to expose themselves to the enormous
potential costs and liability that can arise from duty of care litigation6 forces corporations to provide some sort of protection
against this vulnerability. Until recently, most corporations indemnified their directors against duty of care derivative suits by
purchasing directors and officers liability insurance (D & 0 insurance).' As a result of recent increases in the volume of shareduty to keep themselves informed in some detail, and it is this duty which the
defendant in my judgment failed adequately to perform.
Recently, the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project has attempted
to codify a model definition of the duty of care. Section 4.01 provides:
A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in
good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position under similar circumstances.
AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN·
DATIONS § 4.0l(a), at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 4).
States differ in their interpretation of duty of care standards. See Tentative Draft No.
4, 29-43 (reporter's note to § 4.0l(a)) for a survey of duty of care standards under state
laws. In Delaware, a director's duty of care liability must be "predicated upon concepts
of gross negligence." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
4. See The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56 [hereinafter BusiNESS WEEK) ("It was not until the 1960s that, under pressure from Washington and Wall
Street, companies began to emphasize the election of outsiders.").
5. A great deal has been written on the role of the outside director. Two seminal
works are M. EISENBERG, supra note 1 and M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
(1971). See M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 172 ("Since the board's principal function is
to monitor management's performance, and since a director who is not independent can
scarcely be trusted to perform that function, board membership for such persons seems
counterproductive.").
6. Damages for duty of care violations are based on the tort principle that a negligent
party should be liable for all the foreseeable consequences resulting from his negligence.
This can lead to potentially staggering liability in the context of a large modern corporation. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). After the Delaware Supreme Court found the directors liable for breaching their duty of care, the parties
agreed to settle for $23.5 million. The indemnification insurance policy covered only $10
million of the settlement, but, fortunately for the directors, the acquiring Pritzker group
paid the difference. ·
7. D & 0 insurance first appeared in the 1960's and has been a subject of controversy
ever since. For a discussion of the coverage of D & 0 policies and the debate over the
merits of indemnifying directors against duty of care liability, see J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE (1981):
The fundamental policy considerations are, of course, on the one hand, fairness
to the individual and the need to induce competent people to serve, or at least
not to discourage them from serving, as corporate directors and officers, balanced against, on the other hand, the undesirability of immunizing corporate
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holder derivative actions, 8 and the size of court awards, 9 however, D & 0 insurance premiums have skyrocketed. 10 Many
companies can no longer find, or afford, insurance for their directors.11 Without D & 0 insurance, corporations are finding jt
difficult to attract and retain qualified outside directors. 12 A
number of corporations have suffered mass resignations of
outside directors when it was discovered that they could not renew their liability insurance. 13
The inability of corporations to, indemnify their directors has
led to an alarming trend. For the first time since the 1960's, the
management, or permitting it to immunize itself, from the consequences of its
negligence or misconduct.
Id. 11 1.02.
8. A 1986 study by the Wyatt Company compared the amount of litigation against
directors in 1974 with that in 1984. The survey found that the number of companies
reporting one or more claims against directors and officers rose 162 %, an increase from
7.1 % to 18.6~;,. Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at Dl,
cols. 2, 3.
9. Id. The Wyatt Study also found that the percentage of claims with payment over
$1 million increased 73%, from 4.8% to 8.3%, and the average defense cost per claim
increased 154%, from $181,500 to $461,000.
10. A 1986 study by Korn/Ferry International, a management search firm, found that
D & 0 insurance premiums on the average rose 362% from 1984 to 1985. At the same
time, total dollar coverage decreased on the average from $59,064,000 to $34,131,000.
KORN/FERRY INT'L, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 20 (1986) [hereinafter BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY]. See infra note 12 for other findings of the study.
11. The New York Times noted:
Most companies are experiencing a double blow: The amount of coverage they
can get has been cut drastically, from as much as $50 million to $150 million last
year to $10 million to $35 million, while the premiums they must pay for even
that reduced coverage have increased as much as tenfold. And in certain industries-such as steel, petroleum and electronics-there may be a problem simply
finding an insurer.
Lewin, supra note 8, at Dl, col. 3.
12. A 1985 study by Korn/Ferry International surveyed 592 corporations from a
broad range of American businesses. They found:
1. Sixty percent of the companies polled said that recent court decisions affecting overall responsibilities of corporate boards are creating potentially dangerous
precedents, inhibiting a company's ability to attract new directors. Thirty-four
percent said they thought recent court decisions would hurt them in retaining
existing directors.
2. Nearly 62% of the chief executive officers polled said they will reduce the
number of directorships they accept because of increased liability.
3. Fifty-two percent of the companies polled reported that the sharp rise in directors' and officers' liability insurance will make it more difficult to recruit high
level outside directors. The companies surveyed said they are paying, on average,
362% more for D & 0 coverage this year than last year, and some companies
cannot get D & 0 insurance at any price.
4. One out of five qualified candidates turned down an invitation to serve as a
director.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY, supra note 10, at 1.
13. BusINESS WEEK, supra note 4, at 56 (citing 10 instances since 1984 where the loss
of liability insurance has led to mass resignations of outside directors).
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makeup of boards is shifting to company insiders. 14 The percentage of outside directors on the boards of the largest 1000 industrial companies dropped to 57.5% in 1986 from 63.2% in 1985. 111
The trend is likely to continue if insurance costs do not decrease.16 This shift is particularly troublesome because it comes
at a time when courts are requiring directors to take a more active role in scrutinizing the behavior of management in the face
of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and other vital corporate
concerns which often pit management's interests against the interests of the shareholders. 17
A less obvious, but equally harmful, by-product of the insurance crunch is its chilling effect on entrepreneurial activity. Excessive duty of care liability can deter the willingness of directors to engage in risk-taking activity. 18 Excessive potential
liability also can affect the quality of a director's decision. Al14. Id. at 57. If corporate boards are dominated by insiders, then their ability to
monitor management's actions will be greatly impaired. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 57. Heidrick & Struggles, an executive search firm, provided statistics based
on their annual survey of major corporations. This is the first marked decline since 1966,
when the firm initially began tracking these numbers.
16. Id. at 56 (quoting a director of an executive search firm who predicted "[a] trend
toward smaller boards, fewer meetings, and more inside directors"). This could effectively lead to a return to the traditional style of directing where the board acted as a
rubber stamp for management.
17. Several recent cases have emphasized the importance of impartial behavior by
outside directors when faced with a hostile bid. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986):
Once it becomes apparent that a takeover target will be acquired by new owners,
whether by an alleged "raider" or by a team consisting of management and a
"white knight," it becomes the duty of the target's directors to see that the
shareholders obtain the best price possible for their stock. "The directors' role
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company."
Id. at 886-87 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
18. Professor Conard first advanced this argument:
Another probable avoidance response to the threat of liability claims is to expend great effort on establishing a record of diligence. Directors may refuse to
make decisions unless they are supplied with opinions of accountants certifying
the accuracy of financial statements, appraisers' estimates of the value of
properties, forecasts by management consultants of profit prospects, engineers'
analyses of production costs, and lawyers' opinions about the legality of a course
of conduct. Directors may insist, as a condition of affirmative action, that the
documents take strong positive views of a proposed course, so as to prove on any
later audit that the directors used "due diligence." Such an attitude would force
managers to find and use consultants who tend more toward optimism than toward candor and illumination. In this way, the fear of liability may tend to degrade, rather than to elevate, the decisional processes of directors.
Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability For Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J.
895, 903-04 (citations omitted).
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though some directors may reach more sound decisions than
they otherwise might if not threatened with liability, others may
be so concerned with maintaining a documented record of diligence in order to ensure protection under the business judgment
rule that, consequently, their attention is diverted away from
solving the company's problems. 19
These concerns over excessive director liability were heightened in early 1985 when the Delaware Supreme Court decided
Smith v. Van Gorkom (the Trans Union case). 20 Before Trans
Union, courts rarely found individual directors liable for breaching their duty of care in the absence of some form of self-dealing.21 In Trans Union the court reversed this trend by holding a
board of directors liable for breaching its duty of care despite
the lack of any evidence indicating bad faith or self-dealing. The
directors' liability was predicated on their failure to inform
themselves and deliberate sufficiently before approving a takeover offer. 22
Recent business articles support this concern. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 8, at Dl, col.
4 (citing New York lawyer Martin Lipton's observation of "a real risk of overcaution"
caused by excessive liability exposure). But see Frankel, Corporate Directors's Duty of
Care: The American Law lnstitute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 705, 713 (1984) ("The duty of care, however, helps ensure that directors are attentive to prevent the kind of risk that does not benefit the corporation.").
19. See Conard, supra note 18, at 904-05.
20. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
21. Commentators often cite Professor Bishop's seminal article on the indemnification of corporate directors, in which he noted that "[t]he search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been lield liable in derivative suits for negligence
uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968); see also
Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REv. 591, 591 (1983)
("Cases that assess damages against negligent management are rare to the point of becoming an endangered species.").
Most commentators agree that mismatched liability for duty of care violations has led
to judicial nullification of the duty of care principle in ·many circumstances. See Conard,
Theses For a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 259, 267 (1986):
Trial judges, whom higher courts recurrently find to have made erroneous rulings, are understandably reluctant to impose million-dollar liabilities on their
counterparts in commerce whose decisions appear to have been in error. Courts
find many ways, the foremost of which is the business judgment rule, to negate
the application of the liability principle.
However, since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Francis v. United Jersey Bank
in 1981, courts have been willing to impose director liability for duty of care violations in
cases involving financial institutions. See Fitzpatrick v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 765
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
22. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985). Briefly stated, a class suit
was filed against Van Gorkom, who was the Chief Executive Officer, and the Trans
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In response to the Trans Union decision and the problems
created by the insurance crisis, the Delaware legislature modified its duty of care provisions. Effective July 1, 1986, section
102(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which enumerates the provisions a Delaware corporation may include in its
certificate of incorporation, was amended by the addition of subsection (7). 23 The new section 102(b)(7) is an enabling act that
permits corporations, through stockholder-approved charter
amendments, to eliminate or limit their directors' monetary liability for violations of their duty of care. 24 The possible eliminaUnion board alleging a breach of duty by the directors in approving a merger offer from
the Pritzker group. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the directors were not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule because their decision was not an
informed one. The directors failed to conduct a valuation study or make other efforts to
determine whether the price offered was fair. Subsequent attempts to solicit other competing offers were found to be ineffectual because of the constraints imposed by the
Pritzker pre-merger agreement. The shareholders' ratification of the proposal did not
excuse the directors because the shareholders had been misled into believing that the
directors had carefully negotiated a fair price.
For an analysis supporting the Delaware Supreme Court's application of the duty of
care in. the Trans Union decision, see Burgman & Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate
Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CoRP. L.
311 (1986). For a criticism of the decision, see Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and
the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions have also found directors liable for duty of care
violations when they failed to deliberate sufficiently before approving a takeover offer.
See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986):
It is not enough that directors merely be disinterested and thus not disposed to
self-dealing or other indicia of a breach of the duty of loyalty. Directors are also
held to a standard of due care. They must meet this standard with "conscientious fairness." For example, where their "methodologies and procedures" are
"so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or
halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham," then inquiry into their acts is
not shielded by the business judgment rule.
Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
See also Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing the
above excerpt from Hanson in support of a similar decision to forbid business judgment
rule protection of a rubber stamp decision of outside directors).
23. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) reads as follows:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under section
174 of this Title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability
of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be
deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not
authorized to issue capital stock.
24. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the duty of care standard in Delaware.

WINTER

1987]

Directors' Duty of Care

549

tion of monetary damages does not excuse directors of their duty
of care. Directors will still be charged with the duty of care in
their decisionmaking process, and courts will be able to provide
equitable remedies in relevant cases such as mergers or acquisitions in which the plaintiffs are suing for injunctive relief. This
enabling act does not permit exemptions from liability in cases
of bad faith, breach of loyalty, or any other form of selfdealing. 211
Because of Delaware's preeminence in the field of corporate
law, many states are likely to follow with similar legislation that
will permit corporations to limit duty of care liability. 26 This
Note explores the corporate law principles guiding the amendment of section 102(b)(7) and considers what effects this statute
will have on the investor-director relationship. The Note focuses
on whether this reform measure excessively protects directors at
the expense of shareholders.
Part I analyzes the neoclassical economic view of the contractual relationship between stockholders and management that
serves as the theoretical justification of section 102(b)(7). Part II
proposes a modification of the Delaware statute that would pro25. Exemption from personal liability can only apply to the actions of directors qua
directors. The.statute does not shield from monetary liability inside directors who make
decisions in their capacities as officers.
26. Before the enactment of the new Delaware legislation, both Indiana and Virginia
had already adopted novel approaches to the insurance crisis. The Indiana legislature
completely emasculated directors' duty of care liability. Effective April 1, 1986, Indiana
amended § 23-1-35-1 of the Indiana Code to eliminate any duty of care liability unless
the breach or failure to perform constituted willful misconduct or recklessness. IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-l(e) (West Supp. 1986). Virginia redefined directors' duty of care narrowly in terms of a subjective good faith business judgment, thereby eliminating an objective standard. VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985).
Michigan has recently enacted legislation similar to Delaware's. Effective March 1,
1987, § 450.1209 of the Michigan Compiled Laws allows corporations to include in their
articles of incorporation a provision eliminating or limiting directors' monetary liability
for duty of care violations. Act No. 1, § 209, Enrolled Senate Bill No. 18 (Feb. 27, 1987)
(to be codified at MICH COMP. LAWS § 450.1209).
Other states will no doubt feel compelled to reduce directors' liability in order to compete successfully with Delaware for corporate charters. Corporate law scholars have debated the wisdom of this state competition. Advocates of federal regulation of corporations argue that state competition produces a regulatory system that caters to
management interests at the expense of shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). The neoclassical school disagrees with this theory, arguing that state competition leads to the development of optimal laws. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). For
a recent empirical study of why firms choose to incorporate or reincorporate in Delaware,
see Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. &
0RG. 225 (1985).
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vide for periodic shareholder review of charter amendments limiting liability.
I.

CHARTER AMENDMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS THEORY

The Delaware legislature's addition of section 102(b)(7) is not
merely an attempt to reverse an unpopular court decision. The
amendment appears to represent a shift in the traditional theoretical underpinnings of the investor-management relationship.
Instead of relying on duty of care liability rule~ to monitor management actions, this new approach relies on market constraints
and private contracting to protect shareholder interests. This
Part analyzes the desirability of leaving shareholders and directors responsible for contractually determining liability through
charter amendments.
A.

Investor-Management Relations: The Neoclassical Theory
of the Firm

Over the past decade, the escalation of derivative suits and
indemnification costs has divided scholars over the utility of liability rules that enforce the duty of care. 27 All recognize that
without any constraints directors may tend to "fall asleep at the
wheel" and simply serve as rubber stamps for management deci27. Numerous articles have presented both sides of the issue. For an example of the
neoclassical economics argument criticizing the use of liability rules, see Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986). Fischel and Bradley cite
empirical evidence in support of their claim that liability rules do not play a fundamental role in aligning the interests of investors and managers.
In defense of the duty of care, see Frankel, supra note 18. Frankel responds to critics
of the duty of care who claim that it is too costly and ineffective.
The American Law lnstitute's (ALI) attempt to draft its Principles of Corporate Governance has sharpened the scholarly debate over the utility of duty of care liability. The
current draft supports the imposition of duty of care liability under a monitoring model.
See Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 3, § 4.01. With respect to the controversy over
limiting duty of care liability, the ALI is currently considering its own innovative proposal that would allow corporations to limit duty of care liability to the amount of benefits
that a director or an officer receives. The ALI has not yet officially agreed to a position
on this issue. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 7.17 (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Tentative Draft
No. 6). For a discussion of the ALI position, see Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
789 (1985). See also infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
the debate.
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sions. Disagreement arises over the necessity for liability rules to
constrain management negligence.
Two schools of thought have developed. Proponents of the
neoclassical market model argue that duty of care liability is
costly and unnecessary because market mechanisms adequately
constrain directors' behavior. 28 These market constraints arise
from the efficient workings of three markets: the securities market, the executive employment market, and the products market. 29 Greatly simplified, the argument turns on the premise that
a poorly run firm will be subject to hostile takeovers and other
market responses that threaten the job security and prestige of
management and otherwise reduce the value of management's
services. 30 The stock price will reflect any harm to the corporation caused by management's negligence. If the likely decrease
in personal wealth and prestige of management resulting from
the lower price is not alone an effective deterrent against negligence, directors must also recognize that the stock market functions as a market for corporate control. If the price drops too
low, directors may lose their jobs in a hostile takeover. 31
Critics of the neoclassical model argue that market constraints
, are not consistent enough to deter and discipline inefficient
management. 32 These critics defend the imposition of duty of
care liability as a necessary mechanism for protecting share28. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 27; Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance:
A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 653 (1984); Scott, Corporation Law and
the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 936
(1983). Professor Scott argues that duty of care liability is of minor importance because
the capacity of the board members to prevent bad decisions is inherently limited by·their
ex post facto monitoring role. The director's job is "to distinguish bad decisions from
bad luck in the aftermath of a bad outcome." Id.
29. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 836-42 (1981).
30. For a more thorough discussion of the functioning of the market for corporate
control, see id. at 841-45.
31. Phillips lists four principal reasons why management would want to avoid a decrease in the value of the corporation's securities: (1) increased likelihood of hostile takeovers, (2) decline in wealth of the manager's personal stock holdings in the corporation,
(3) decreased likelihood of alternative bids for the manager's services, and (4) a decrease
in market value that would increase capital costs and thereby decrease the corporation's
ability to compete in the corporation's product markets. Phillips, supra note 28, at 67475.
- 32. For example, when corporations adopt antitakeover measures such as poison pills
and dual class capitalization plans, they impede the market for corporate control by substantially raising the transaction costs of acquiring the corporation. See Coffee, Regulat·
ing the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role
in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). Coffee argues that the enormous costs involved in mounting hostile bids means that this deterrent force "is likely to
be limited to instances of gross managerial failure." Id. at 1200.
In defense of the neoclassical theory, however, the recent growth of junk bond financing has shown that large corporations are no longer invulnerable to a takeover bid. The

552

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:2

holder interests and providing an incentive for derivative litigation over the duty of care. 33 They believe that management influence over outside directors is so great that without liability
rules the board would have little incentive to challenge management's recommendations. 34
This Note does not attempt to resolve the dispute over the
effectiveness of liability rules and market mechanisms in regulating management behavior. Instead, this Part examines the
second component of the Delaware approach-the use of private
contracting through charter amendments to determine optimal
levels of liability.
The use of charter amendments in the Delaware approach is
based on the neoclassical economic theory of the firm. The neoclassical model views the firm as a nexus of contracts-contracts
between the firm and investors, employees, suppliers, and consumers. 311 In large, publicly held corporations, the separation of
ultimate effectiveness of the market for corporate control will depend on whether the law
continues to permit corporations to adopt antitakeover measures. See Gilson, supra note
29, at 844-45, for a discussion of the dangers of antitakeover measures. See also infra
note 60.
33. The driving force behind duty of care derivative litigation is the plaintiff's attorney. Without any director liability, there will certainly be a dramatic reduction in both
valid a'1d frivolous duty of care claims. For a discussion of the role of plaintiff's attorneys
in enforcing derivative claims, see Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). Coffee noted that "our system has long
accepted, if somewhat uneasily, the concept of the plaintiff's attorney as an entrepreneur
who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable conduct." Id. at 678.
34. Critics of the neoclassical model argue that reputation and market factors are not
powerful enough forces to overcome the pressure of collegiality in the boardroom. See,
e.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 145. The structural bias that grows out of a business
ethic under which directors are expected to protect management from attack by outsiders makes outside directors reluctant to challenge management actions.
Some theorists have even posited the general lack of corporate accountability as a
product of American cultural disfavor for any meddling with business affairs. A recent
New York Times article discussed the cultural characteristics which accounted for American reluctance to overturn authority:
In addition, Americans are taught from an early age to value and respect individuality, to resent meddling with their business affairs, and to loathe any system that smacks of a Big Brother type of watchdog. In business, that often
translates into a distaste for any system of checks and balances on executive
behavior, even from a chief executive's board.
Prokesch, America's Imperial Chief Executive, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, § 3, at 1, col.
1, at 25, col. 3.
35. For a more sophisticated explanation of the neoclassical theory of the firm, see
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983); Jenson & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). For a critique of the "nexus of contracts"
theory, see Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
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ownership and control represents an efficient contractual specialization of function. The rational investor will invest in several different enterprises in order to minimize his risk. 36 He
lacks the management skill and the inclination to watch closely
over the businesses in which he has invested, so he contracts
with professional managers to supervise the corporation. Managers benefit because they can pursue profitable business opportunities even though they lack large personal wealth. 37
This theory also recognizes certain costs inherent in the investor-managem~nt contractual relationship. The most important
of these costs, labeled "agency costs," is the incentive that managers and directors have to shirk their duties. 38 Because managers are not risking their own money, they have les~ incentive to
concentrate on maximizing firm wealth than if they themselves
were the principals.
Two mechanisms can reduce agency costs: market forces and
private bargaining. Competition in the securities and employment markets reduces the divergence of interests between managers and investors. 39 Neoclassical theory also recognizes that
shareholders can use their bargaining position in the contractual
relationship to negotiate disincentives to management self-dealing. For example, stock bonus plans provide an incentive for
wealth maximization by indexing management compensation to
the overall wealth of the firm.
This concept of stockholder-management bargaining justifies
the charter amendment approach conceptually. By requiring
stockholder approval of a charter amendment, section 102(b)(7)
allows stockholders and directors to allocate the optimal amount
of duty of care liability. In a perfect market situation, with no
contracting costs, this approach would be ideal. One might easily
imagine that for many highly competitive industries, stockholdtract, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF THE BUSINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser
ed. 1985).
36. Under the "portfolio theory," an efficient portfolio requires investments in a large
number of firms in different industries. A diversified investor will thereby assume the
risk of the market as a whole, called the systematic risk, but avoid the risk specific to
each individual firm. For a discussion of how duty of care liability can reduce the level of
systematic risk, see Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 748-52 (1984).
37. Fischel, supra not~ 28, at 1262.
38. Agency costs include, in addition to the residual loss from the failure to maximize
wealth, the costs of monitoring management behavior, and the costs of providing share·
holders with assurances that management will not shirk their duties. See Jenson &
Meckling, supra note 35, at 308.
39. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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ers may wish to allow directors to opt out of duty of care liability in order to encourage risk-taking and to reduce the heavy
costs of insurance indemnification. Others may wish to put a cap
on liability, while still others, who have less trust in management, may not wish to alter the status quo. Whatever the position of stockholders, the current insurance crisis demonstrates
that unlimited liability is not optimal for many corporations, especially those that cannot afford insurance.

B.

A Problem with the Delaware Model: Information Costs

Although the charter amendment approach may be conceptually attractive because it allows parties to allocate optimally_
their own risk, the realities of shareholder bargaining power suggest that charter amendments are rarely a product of fair bargaining. Widespread shareholder apathy," 0 combined with management control of the proxy process, 41 suggests that these
parties may not be able to allocate fairly the risk of director negligence. Unless institutional investors demonstrate a greater interest in corporate governance, any attempts to eliminate or
limit liability through charter amendments will usually reflect a
bias in favor of the management position.
Critics of the agency-costs theory have noted that in large
publicly held corporations scattered investors have little or no
ability to negotiate the terms of management's employment. 42
Shareholders often are asked merely to ratify a charter amendment which interested directors have proposed. The shareholders are limited to rejecting or accepting the deal formulated by
the interested directors. Even if the proposed amendment was
reasonable, the stockholders should be entitled to have someone
negotiate the optimal level of director liability with shareholder
interests in mind. The interested directors cannot fulfill that
role. 43
40. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
42. For an extensive criticism of the agency-costs theory, see Brudney, supra note 35,
at 1414-20. Professor Brudney disputes the contention that stockholders have the ability
to contract with management, or that the market can effectively implement investor constraints on management. Stockholders do not have the knowledge or ability to learn
about or affect the terms of the relationship that they are supposedly contracting.
43. This dilemma is analogous to the problem which occurs when shareholders are
asked to ratify corporate transactions with interested directors. Shareholders are entitled
to have the best deal possible negotiated for them, not to have their choices limited to

WINTER

1987]

Directors' Duty of Care

555

Not surprisingly, an initial informal survey of charter amendment proposals conducted in the first few months after adoption
of section 102(b)(7) found that virtually all were for the complete elimination of liability."" Given the high costs of D & 0 insurance and management's self-interest in reducing their exposure to liability, management has little reason not to propose a
complete elimination of liability unless it anticipates difficulty
selling the idea to shareholders. In smaller companies and financially troubled companies, management may have trouble convincing shareholders to eliminate liability, but the vast majority
of Delaware corporations are not likely to encounter substantial
resistance to charter amendment proposals to eliminate
liability. •11
One factor that decreases shareholder negotiating power stems
from the structural advantage management retains in the proxy
system. For an independent shareholder, the opportunity costs
· of reviewing a proxy statement and subsequently casting a vote
outweigh the benefits of an informed vote. 46 This phenomenon is
commonly referred to as the rational apathy problem. 47 Unless
the individual shareholder possesses a large block of stock, his
personal vote will have little or no impact. 48 Even if the costs of
review are minimal, a rational shareholder may seek a free ride
and abstain from voting if he believes that enough of the other
shareholders will respond.4 9 Because of individual shareholders'
rejecting or accepting a deal formulated by interested parties. See Marsh, Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 48-49 (1966).
44. See Early Foul-Ups in the Stampede to Delaware's New Liability-Limiting
Statute, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Aug. 1986, at 7 (news update published by The American Lawyer). None of the lawyers consulted were aware of any company that has chosen
to cap liability instead of eliminating it completely.
45. Charter amendments proposed by financially troubled corporations probably face
a far greater chance of defeat for the simple reason that stockholders will be more alert
to directors' attempts to avoid liability. Shareholders usually take a greater interest in
board decisions when a corporation's viability is at stake.
Closely held corporations and smaller corporations will fit the negotiating model of the
agency-cost theory better than large corporations because the rational apathy problem
will decrease as the number of shareholders decreases. Shareholders in a closely held
corporation are likely to be directly involved in management or the supervision of management, and the percentage of their ownership will be substantial.
46. For a general discussion of this problem and stockholder voting, see R. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986).
47. Id.
48. Institutional investors almost always own sufficient stock to warrant their informed voting on corporate governance questions. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of institutional investor voting.
49. Because an active shareholder cannot retain all the benefits of his supervisory
efforts unless he owns 100% of the stock, an externality is created. Other .shareholders
will recognize this and try to reap the benefits of this externality without incurring the
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preference for the free ride, shareholders' interests in large publicly held corporations will not be represented unless a shareholder amongst them has vast interests that outweigh the costs
of informed voting. Large institutional investors can often fulfill
this role.

C. Institutional Investors: A Correcting Mechanism?
This section considers whether institutional investors can supply the bargaining power which the charter amendment approach requires but individual shareholders lack. Institutional
investors have the resources and motivation to cast informed
votes on charter amendment proposals. 60 If institutional investors represented the interests of all stockholders, then charter
amendments would reflect effective bargaining over risk allocation. The evidence, however, suggests that most institutional investors, with the possible exception of public pension funds, are
reluctant to involve themselves in such corporate governance
questions, and, when they do vote, they rarely oppose management.1H If this behavior continues, shareholder interests will not
be adequately represented in most proceedings to adopt charter
amendments that restrict or eliminate director liability.
Historically, institutional investors have been reluctant to involve themselves in corporate decisionmaking. 112 If corporate policies appear inappropriate, institutional investors have preferred
costs of informed voting. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 778-80 (1978), for a thorough discussion of
the free rider problem.
50. The term institutional investors includes banks, insurance companies, mutual
funds, public and private pension funds, and nonprofit institutions such as university
endowments. Institutional investors are the largest holders of stock in most of the nation's leading corporations. A 1978 Senate study on institutional investor holdings found
that large institutional investors often hold "over five percent of the outstanding shares
of a major corporate enterprise and many multiples of that held by the largest individual
investors." J. ALLEN, THE EXERCISE OF VOTING RIGHTS BY LARGE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
(1977), reprinted in STAFF OF SuBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., VOTING RIGHTS IN MAJOR CORPORATIONS 559, 569 (Comm. Print 1978).
For a recent example of the vast holdings of public pension funds, see Dunphy, Wall
Street's Waking Giants, Det. Free Press, Feb. 1, 1987, at lG, col. 2. The article lists the
State of Michigan Pension Fund's top 10 stock holdings, including the number of shares,
percentage of the fi~m owned, and rank among shareholders. For example, the Michigan
Pension Fund is the top shareholder of Chase Manhattan Corporation with 3.8 million
shares, constituting a 4.7% ownership of Chase. The Pension Fund has $14.2 billion in
assets.
51. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
52, M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 57:
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to liquidate their holdings, if possible, rather than remaining
and seeking a change in management policy or personnel. 113 The
failure of institutional investors to exercise their power to influence management has often led to the entrenchment of management by default. 11• Even when institutional investors vote, they
rarely oppose management. Professor Melvin Eisenberg has advanced several reasons fo:r this pro-management position: personal feelings of obligation to follow the mores of the financial
community; a desire to stay on good terms with management in
order to obtain inside information; and, in the case of certain
institutions such as banks, a desire to retain or cultivate business in a noninvestor capacity. 1111
Institutional investors, particularly public pension funds, have
started to challenge management more often. In 1985, the Council of Institutional Investors was established to give pension
funds a greater voice in corporate governance matters and serve
as a catalyst for more active institutional investment. 116 The
long-run effectiveness of the Council remains to be seen, but anecdotal evidence suggests that some public pension funds are
starting to crusade against management policies that threaten
shareholder interests. 117
Despite the increased participation of pension funds, other institutional investors are not likely to alter significantly their past
voting behavior. Investment companies and banks are particuGenerally speaking, the institutional investors have taken the position that their
primary obligation lies to their own beneficiaries, not to their fellow shareholders
in portfolio companies; that they have neither the time nor the skills to exercise
an oversight function; and that a company whose management should be
changed is normally an unsound investment, so that an investor who does not
like incumbent management should switch out of the investment as quickly as
possible, rather than stay in and try to accomplish a change.
53. Id.
54. See D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS 160 (1965). Baum and Stiles
argue that institutional investors have a duty to their fellow shareholders to oversee
management. With the power of their holdings comes the responsibility of informed
voting.
55. M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 57. Institutional investors can use their power to
maintain close contacts with management. These contacts are useful for confirming rumors or simply keeping informed of company developments. The information they obtain rarely constitutes material nonpublic information under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; nevertheless, it is of value to investors.
56. Hearings Focus on Pension Plan Role in Voting Corporate Governance Proxies,
17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 130, 131 (Jan. 18, 1985).
57. See Dunphy, supra note 50. Dunphy discusses the reaction of the Council of Institutional Investors to the General Motors decision to buy out H. Ross Perot. The
Council insisted that General Motors Chairman Roger Smith attend a meeting in New
York to defend the company's actions. Members of the Council control more than seven
million shares of General Motors stock.
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larly vulnerable to corporate pressures to approve antitakeover
charter amendments or similar measures. They risk the loss of
the business of that corporation in future transactions if they
adopt a confrontational attitude. 58 Pension funds are able to
avoid these pressures because they do not have to maintain separate business relations with management outside of their particular investment in the company.
The risk of legal liability that may result from any group efforts to monitor management also deters institutional investors
from supervisory activism. If institutional investors combined
their forces to elect directors, they could be found to be "controlling shareholders" and prima facie liable for any violations of
securities laws committed by the companies they control. 59 They
may also be considered insiders and forced to surrender any
short swing profits as defined under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 6° Finally, if a group of investors combined to elect directors in competing companies, they may be
liable for violating the Clayton Act antitrust laws. 61 Resolution
of these problems is a prerequisite for institutional investors to
participate in the supervision of their portfolio companies. 62
58. E. FLAX, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUESTIONS, 1985 PROXY SEASON (Investor Responsibility Research Center Corporate Governance Service, Oct. 1985) [hereinafter IRRC STUDY). The study cited testimony from Labor Department hearings held in January 1985 on the role of pension funds in the
corporate governance process. At those hearings, Roger Murray, a long-time director of
mutual funds, noted:
The investment manager retains his clients and earns his fees by delivering
good performance, which is measured against market indexes at frequent intervals. No plan sponsor adds to the performance measures points for thoughtful
consideration of corporate governance issues. On the other hand, voting portfolio
shares against the antitakeover proposals of a present or prospective client is
seldom perceived as the best way to cement or create a warm relationship.
Id. at 19.
59. Professor Conard has written on the problem of potential liability of institutional
investors for supervisory activism. Conard, supra note 21, at 281-83. The liability of controlling shareholders is enumerated in the Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770
(1982); and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
60. Conard, supra note 21, at 282; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
61. Conard, supra note 21, at 282. The Clayton Act forbids the same person from
holding directorships in competing companies. Institutional investors could be found liable if directors elected with their support were found to be de facto deputies of the
institutional investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
62. See Conard, supra note 21, at 293-94, for his suggestions for reform. He recommends amending the language of the relevant provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Clayton Act to exclude their application to
institutional investor supervision of management.
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A recent Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
study of institutional investor voting on antitakeover charter
amendments indicates that the level of opposition to antitakeover proposals has increased, although it has amounted to a rejection of only four percent of all antitakeover proposals. 63 The
remarkably high approval rate for antitakeover measures indicates the likely success rate of proposals to eliminate duty of
care liability. Antitakeover proposals arguably endanger stockholder interests by entrenching management and thereby impeding the ability of the market to deter poor management with
the threat of hostile takeovers. 64 In addition to losing this market mechanism for monitoring director performance, stockholders forego the potential opportunity to sell their shares at a premium in the event of a hostile bid. Proposals to eliminate duty
of care liability may pose a similar threat to stockholder interests by reducing existing constraints on directors' shirking of
their responsibilities and eliminating a source of compensation
in the event of a successful duty of care derivative suit. 65
The high success rate of antitakeover proposals also reflects
careful research by management before submitting any charter
amendment proposals. The IRRC study indicates that many corporations are using proxy solicitation firms and public relations
firms to survey shareholder voting behavior and evaluate the
63. IRRC STUDY, supra note 58, at 15. Of the more than 450 antitakeover charter
amendment proposals which the IRRC obtained voting results for, only 19 proposals
were defeated. Id. at 1. The study noted:
Even though most proposals won approval in 1985, the level of opposition was
noteworthy in many instances. In fact, a comparison of voting results for 1985
and 1984 shows that the level of opposition was actually higher in 1985 for some
types of proposals. These levels of opposition are a fairly sure sign of continuing
institutional opposition to antitakeover proposals. While some institutions may
have succumbed to pressures to soften their opposition to shark repellents, many
others have maintained or even heightened their opposition.
Id. at 15.
64. The market for corporate control cannot effectively deter inefficient management
if target corporations are able to enact antitakeover plans that raise the transaction costs
of acquiring a corporation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson,
supra note 29, at 844-45. Easterbrook and Fischel argue for a rule of managerial passivity under which management of the target company would not be allowed to resist a bid.
But cf. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980). Lipton argues that the threat of
takeovers may impair management performance by overemphasizing short run stock
prices at the expense of longer term investment.
65. This threat to shareholder interests must be balanced against the benefits to the
corporation resulting from lower insurance payments, less litigation, and the freeing of
the directors to engage in efficient transactions that they do not now enter into because
of fear of lawsuits. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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chances of success before putting proposals on the ballot. 66 Some
corporations have chosen not to introduce antitakeover charter
amendment proposals when they perceived a substantial risk of
defeat. 67 This suggests that the possibility of defeat may· deter
some corporations from proposing charter amendments to limit
liability.
The results of the IRRC study suggest that the power of
shareholders to negotiate director liability is grossly inadequate.
Even with record levels of institutional investor opposition to
management on corporate governance questions, shareholders
defeated only four percent of all antitakeover charter amendments.68 Unless institutional investor opposition increases, management proposals to eliminate the duty of care liability should
pass without difficulty in financially sound corporations. The
elimination of directors' liability may be appropriate for some
companies; however, the constraints on shareholders inherent in
the principal-agent relationship belie the claim that each company will reach the optimal level of liability through management-investor bargaining.
II. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 102(b)(7)
This Part proposes a modification to the Delaware approach
to mitigate the weak bargaining power of shareholders. The proposed statutory reform would require sunset provisions on charter amendments that limit directors' duty of care liability and
mandate periodic renewal of such charter amendments by shareholder vote. This suggestion appeared originally in a tentative
draft of section 7.l 7(c)(l) of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project. 69 At the time of this writing, the ALI
has not reached an official position on this issue.
A.

Sunset Provisions on Charter Amendments

In order to compensate for shareholders' lack of bargaining
power, an enabling statute such as section 102(b)(7) should include a sunset provision that would cause liability-limiting char66. IRRC STuov. supra note 58, at 1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Tentative Draft No. 6, supra note 27, § 7.17(c)(l); see reporter's comments, id. at
238-39.
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ter amendments to expire after a period of time. 70 The legislature would fix the appropriate length of time, but a suggested
measuring stick would be the normal duration of a board member's single term. In those corporations where directors do not
serve staggered terms, shareholders could contract over the appropriate level of liability prior to each board election. If a director did not approve of those terms, he could choose not to run
for reelection rather than resign in midterm. This scheme would
fit neatly into the contracting theory, 71 because shareholders
would, in effect, be negotiating the appropriate level of liability
while negotiating who will serve as a director. Even in corporations where directors are elected intermittently, this method
would provide a yardstick of how often shareholders and directors have deemed it necessary to renegotiate their contractual
relationship by reelecting or voting out directors.
Requiring periodic renewal by shareholders would, at a minimum, strengthen the conceptual basis of section 102(b)(7) by reducing the adhesive nature of charter amendments. Without a
sunset provision, investors who purchase shares after the original passage of the charter amendment are forced to accept duty
of care liability terms that may not be to their liking. The future
shareholder could, of course, invest elsewhere, but, if duty of
care limitations are adopted on a widespread basis, that may not
be a viable option. A bargaining approach to duty of care liability, as adopted in section 102(b)(7), must therefore provide future shareholders with a method of altering duty of care liability
agreements which they had no influence over. Mandatory sunset
provisions would provide shareholders with an inexpensive and
simple mechanism for reestablishing duty of care liability. If
shareholders were forced to introduce their own proxy proposals
to revoke previously ratified charter amendments, the enormous
costs involved would deter all but the rare shareholder. 72
Those states that wish to follow the charter amendment approach but do not want to remove all potential sanctions on directors might couple the sunset provision proposal with non70. Apparently, sunset provisions have not been used before for charter amendments,
so predicting what period of time would be appropriate is difficult. The ALI proposal
suggests specifying the relevant period so that it "extend[s] to a date reasonably after
the annual proxy vote, thus giving incumbent directors an opportunity to resign in the
unlikely event that shareholders failed to renew the provision." Id. at 239.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
72. For a discussion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a-8 requirements for
shareholder proxy proposals, see Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy:
Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93
HARV. L. REV. 670, 672-77 (1980).

562

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:2

monetary sanctions. For example, states could prohibit a
director found liable for breaching their duty of care from serving as an officer, director, or consultant in any corporation for a
period of time. 78 Although not as effective a deterrent as unlimited liability, these career sanctions could be an effective reminder to directors of the importance of the duty of care.

B. Problems with Sunset Provisions
Whether or not sunset prov1s10ns can actually alleviate the
weak bargaining position of shareholders depends on certain assumptions regarding shareholder voting. This section discusses
problems that may prevent sunset provisions from providing any
meaningful protection of shareholder interests.
If shareholder apathy prevents effective voting on original
charter amendment proposals,'" why expect greater •interest in
future ratifications? Reducing the costs of shareholder voting
enough to eliminate this problem is not feasible, but repeated
voting may increase shareholder awareness. Disclosure in a public corporation's annual proxy statement711 of the pros and cons
of the charter amendment would educate many otherwise uninformed shareholders. A special requirement of repeated shareholder approval might also provide significant symbolic value
because it would reinforce the importance of the fiduciary relationship between shareholders and directors.
This suggestion does not pretend that shareholders would
eventually mobilize to engage in optimal arms-length bargaining
with management. 76 Shareholders are unlikely to fail to renew
73. Professor Stone made this proposal in 1975. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
Soc1AL CONTROL or CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 148-49 (1975). Stone would prohibit the director from serving as an officer, director, or consultant of any corporation doing business in
interstate commerce for three years. He argues:
The advantages of the "suspension" provision, by contrast, are that it is not so
easy to get around (notice the "or consultant" proviso); it is not so severe that,
like potential multi-million-dollar personal liability, it would strike courts as unthinkable to impose; but at the same time it would still have some effective
"bite" to it-the suspendees would be removed from the most prestigious and
cushy positions ordinarily available to men of their rank, and would, I suspect,
be objects of some shame among their peers.
Id. at 149.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
75. The tentative ALI proposal recommends annual disclosure in a public corporation's proxy statement. Tentative Draft No. 6, supra note 27, at 238.
76. Indeed, portfolio theory assumes that shareholders are not interested in engaging
in supervision of their individual portfolio investments. They diversify their holdings in
order to minimize firm-specific risk. See supra note 36. Unlike individual shareholders,
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the provision after its original approval if management is perceived to be doing a good job. Management also has the power
to lobby for favorable votes if they fear a possible defeat. 77 They
could engage in strategic behavior by tying in sunset provisions
with other proposals that might act as "sweeteners. " 78 If a corporation subsequently became financially troubled, however,
shareholders would be much more suspicious of a management
proposal to eliminate liability and they would probably be far
more active in representing their interests, whether that meant
reinstating full liability or not.
The unknown variable that will determine the ultimate effectiveness of charter amendments is the institutional investor. If
institutional investors disapprove of duty of care limitations and
find that they cannot avoid these terms by investing in other
comparable firms, then they will likely increase their interest in
corporate governance issues such as duty of care limitations. 79
This involvement would provide the type of shareholder bargaining power that the Delaware approach envisions.
Section 102(b)(7) modified as recommended above is not a
perfect solution. It is an attempt to form a compromise between
legitimate concerns over mismatched director liability and the
need to protect the rights of shareholders from management erosion. The existing system of insurance indemnification fails to
serve anyone's interests effectively. The deep pocket offered by
insurance indemnification promotes frivolous litigation and
leads to the eventual payment of judgments out of the corporation's own funds. 80 Any attempt to reduce duty of care liability
however, institutional investors are often constrained from selling all their shares at the
first sign of bad management because their holdings are too large to be dumped without
depressing the market.
77. Professor Seligman has criticized the proposed use of sunset provisions for dual
class capitalization plans on the grounds that management influence over the proxy system would prevent any effective opposition to ratification. Seligman, Equal Protection in
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 687, 723-24 (1986).
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, discussing the increased vocal opposition of pension funds to management actions of which they disapprove.
·80. Professor Conard has accurately described the indemnification mess:
In order to counter their directors' imminent risk of incurring large defense
costs and their remote risk of eventual liability, corporations have developed the
twin practices of indemnifying directors by payments from corporate treasuries
and buying directors' insurance by payments that come directly from corporate
treasuries or indirectly by way of increased directors' fees.
Although insurance is rarely sufficient to cover directors' potential liability, it
is usually adequate to pay for a settlement of claims, including fees for plaintiffs'
counsel. Plaintiffs and their lawyers are usually glad to settle because they would
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is bound to erode incentives for the enforcement of shareholders'
derivative rights. 81 One must balance this loss, however, against
the gain to shareholders resulting from more effective management decisionmaking, the recruitment of qualified outside directors, and the ultimate decrease in litigation and insurance costs.
At least if directors prove to be less diligent in their decisionmaking, this proposal will provide shareholders with a mechanism for reinstating unlimited liability or imposing a limited cap
on liability.
CONCLUSION

Delaware's adoption of section 102(b)(7) represents a redefinition of the investor-management relationship. The new statute
rejects the traditional use of mandatory liability rules for the enforcement of a director's fiduciary duty of care and, instead, relies on private bargaining and market constraints. Shareholders
and directors may now use charter amendments to allocate the
risk of director negligence as they see fit.
The problem with this new approach is that shareholders are
in a weak position to bargain over duty of care liability. Although the elimination of liability may be optimal in some circumstances, it is conceptually inaccurate to claim that shareholder consent will result in an optimal arrangement.
Other states will no doubt consider enabling legislation similar
to Delaware's section 102(b)(7). States which choose to follow
this charter amendment approach should include in their enabling statute an automatic sunset provision which would require
periodic shareholder approval of any limitation on directors' liability. This provision would serve as a more sound conceptual
foundation for the bargaining approach to investor-director relations. It may also help alleviate the weak bargaining position of
shareholders by increasing their awareness of these charter
have to invest more and more money in the suit as it dragged on and they might
lose it altogether if they pursued it to final judgment. Similar considerations
incline the directors toward settlement. Although the law imposes restrictions on
indemnification and insurance coverage when directors are found guilty or found
liable, a settlement before judgment preempts any such finding. The concatenation of liability, indemnification, insurance, settlements, and awards of attorneys' fees accomplishes very little that is beneficial, and a great deal that is
detrimental.
Conard, supra note 21, at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).
81. See supra note 33 (discussing the importance of the plaintiff's attorney in initiating derivative suits).
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amendment provisions and providing them with an opportunity
to reinstate liability if they are unhappy with management
performance.

-Craig W. Hammond

